Forbearance as Redistribution: The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Brinks, University of Texas, AustinAdvance praise: 'This is one of those rare books that changes forever the way you think about an issue, in this case the endemic and enduring informality found across the developing world.' Ben Ross Schneider, Massachusetts Institute of Technology . This book is an instant classic.' Hillel Soifer, Temple University, PhiladelphiaAdvance praise: 'When we think of law being selectively applied in Latin America, our minds call up accounts of the wealthy and the powerful g

Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows.. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections

Alisha C. . Her research on Latin American and urban politics has appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, and Latin American Research Review. She was a Junior Fellow at the Society of Fellows at Harvard University, Massachusetts. Holland's doctoral d